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The Ocean Enclosure Movement:
Inventory and Prospect
LEWIS M. ALEXANDER*
Since Grotius' time, the ocean enclosure movement has claimed
nearly one-third of global ocean space, with the greatest "gains"
having taken place since 1945. The author traces the development
of the various maritime regimes, and assesses their future viabil-
ity in light of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.
INTRODUCTION
During the past several decades the coastal States of the world
have been extending seaward their claims to jurisdiction over
what has traditionally been recognized as the free seas. Claims
have been both geographical, applied to specific maritime areas
enclosed by boundaries, and functional, pertaining to certain
competences such as control over fishing or drilling for hydrocar-
bons on the continental shelf. The net effect of these claims has
been the gradual partitioning of nearly one-third of the global
ocean into various types of maritime zones.
The process of expanding maritime claims, sometimes termed
"creeping jurisdiction" or "the ocean enclosure movement," may
be approaching a temporary plateau. Most of the coastal States
with at least moderate offshore areas in which to advance their
claims, have declared a 200-mile jurisdictional zone, either exclu-
sive economic, or exclusive fisheries in nature.' And while the
possibility exists that some of these States may increase their as-
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Government.
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April 1983 Vol. 20 No. 3
sertions of competence to the point where the zones become 200-
mile territorial seas, the prospects would not now seem to be
great, given the textual provisions of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (Convention), and the fact that for a
time at least the text will be undergoing a process of ratification.
For the above reasons the time may be right to survey the pro-
gress of the ocean enclosure movement. In this article there will
be, first, a consideration of the development of the maritime juris-
dictional regime, then a treatment of the impacts of current juris-
dictional claims on ocean use, and finally a brief assessment of
some potential trends in the ocean enclosure movement.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARI E JuRIsDIcTIONAL REGIME
"Free" vs. "Closed" Seas
The concept of the free seas is an historic one, dating back to
the voyages of the Phoenicians, the Greeks and the Romans.
Under the free seas concept, navigation could expand as demand
and capabilities warranted. But the Romans, as their empire
grew, saw certain advantages in controlling navigation, and gradu-
ally a "Mare Nostrum" regime evolved for the Mediterranean
whereby non-Roman vessels were subject to various forms of re-
striction. Later, the practice of infringing on freedoms of naviga-
tion developed farther north. In 1201 England issued an
ordinance requiring all vessels at sea to lower their sails when so
ordered by English warships, 2 and by the end of the thirteenth
century Norwegian law forbade foreign ships from sailing north of
Bergen without a royal license.3
In the early seventeenth century, the Dutch, with their overseas
maritime interests, had become the foremost champions of the
freedom of the seas, and in 1605 Hugo Grotius, a young Dutch
lawyer, wrote De Jure Praedae, the twelfth chapter of which was
republished as Mare Liberum.4 Grotius contended that the sea
could not be subjected to private ownership, except in the case of
gulfs and straits, and that navigation and fishing rights of all
countries in the free seas should be respected.5 "Grotius was
cited by the Dutch ambassador to London in a protest against
British policies toward foreign fishermen, and it was during this
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Lnurs IN THE SEAS No. 36, at 2-7 (4th rev. 1981) [hereinafter
cited as LuaTs IN THE SEAS No. 36].
2. C. MEYER, THE ExTENT OF JURISDICTION IN COASTAL WATERS 5 (1937).
3. Id. at 478.
4. H. GRoTIus, MARE LBERUMI SIvE DE JURE QUOD BATAVIS COmpETIT AD IN-
DICANA COMMERCIA (1618).
5. L. ALEXANDER, OFFsHoRE GEOGRAPHY OF NORTHWESTERN EUROPE 11 (1963).
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discussion in 1610 that the maximum range of shore-based cannon
was first suggested as a possible limit for offshore control."
6
The free seas concept was challenged by the British, who were
claiming exclusive fishing rights off their coasts and were con-
cerned with smuggling and protection of neutrality in their
coastal waters. In 1619, John Selden published Mare Clausum
which maintained that the seas were indeed capable of ownership
and, since the resources of the seas were by no means inexhaust-
ible, a State had the right to protect its interests by restricting the
use of certain areas.7 "In the closing years of the seventeenth
century and the earlier part of the next there were many signs
that the era of claiming exclusive sovereignty over extensive re-
gions of the sea was passing away; and that ... the policy of
fixing exact boundaries for special purposes, either by interna-
tional treaties or national laws, was taking its place."8
The marriage of the cannon-shot and fixed-distance concepts
for establishing areas of offshore control was a long and complex
one. Bynkershoek, a Dutchman, published De Domino Maris in
1702, in which he contended that effective dominion over offshore
areas could be maintained only by shore-based fortifications. 9
Yet in the interests of protection against smuggling, neutrality vi-
olations, and foreign fishing, it was clearly necessary that some
sort of coastal zone of fixed breadth be delimited. In 1736 the
British adopted the first of of their "Hovering Acts," establishing a
customs zone twelve miles in breadth along their coasts.10
The concept of the three-mile limit for offshore control is gener-
ally credited to the Italian jurist Galiani, who in 1782 published a
treatise in which he suggested that three miles be taken as the
breadth of uniform belts of sovereignty along the coast." Al-
though he mentioned three miles as the maximum range of can-
non, the distance was well in excess of any cannon range at that
6. S. RIESENFELD, PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of
International Law, Monograph No. 7, 1942).
7. L. ALEXANDER, Supra note 5, at 11.
8. T. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 523 (1911).
9. L. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 12.
10. W. MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
To SMUGGLING 26 (1929).
11. GALANm, DE' DovERI DE' PRINcn'i NEUTRALi VERSO I PRINCrpI GUERREGI-
ANTI, E Di QUEsTI VERSO I NEUTRALi (1782).
time.' 2 Actually Galiani's selection was based on a standard geo-
graphical measure, the marine league; eleven years after his pub-
lication appeared the United States proclaimed a neutrality zone
three miles in breadth, based on what President Washington be-
lieved was the least distance claimed by any nation for neutrality
purposes.13 The American position gradually gained favor in Brit-
ain and, after the British victory at Trafalgar in 1805, the three-
mile principle began to be accepted in other countries.14
Expanding Territorial Claims
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries little effort
was made to standardize maritime rules and regulations on a
worldwide basis. Most coastal States which proclaimed a specific
breadth to the territorial sea claimed three miles,' 5 although by
the early 1920's four miles was claimed by Finland, Norway, Swe-
den and Denmark,' 6 and six miles by Italy.'7 The position of the
Soviet Union was unclear; a 1909 Russian law extended the mari-
time customs belt to twelve miles, and a 1911 law established a
twelve-mile fishing zone along the far-eastern coast. Butler18
holds that the 1921 and 1927 Soviet decrees referring to twelve-
mile zones did not constitute declarations of a nationwide territo-
rial sea, and that it was actually not until 1960 that a formal Soviet
declaration on the territorial sea was made.
In 1930, a Conference on the Codification of International Law
was held at The Hague, during which attention was focused on
the issue of a standard breadth for the territorial sea and other
offshore zones. A survey of state practice in 1930 revealed that
twenty countries were claiming three miles as their territorial
breadth, four were claiming four miles, and two were claiming six
miles.19 No consensus was reached at the Conference on a stan-
dard breadth for the territorial sea.
The process of territorial sea claims since 1930 might be divided
12. C. MEYER, supra note 2, at 47.
13. See H. CROCKER, THE EXTENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA (1919).
14. For background of the origins of the three-mile territorial limit, see P. JEs-
SUP, THE LAW OF TERRrrORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 3-7 (1927); Kent,
The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 Am. J. INT'L L, 537, 537-54 (1954);
Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 22 BRIT. Y.B. Irr'L L 210
(1945).
15. All measurements are in nautical miles. One nautical mile equals 1.151
statute miles or 1.852 kilometers.
16. See S. SWARZTRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE ImiT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS 108-51
(1972).
17. Id. at 148.
18. See W. BUTLER, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 44 (1971).
19. LONDON: REFERENCE DIVISION, CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION, THE IrER-
RrroRLAL SEA (1960).
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into several phases. The first period occurred from 1930 to the
end of World War II. During this time a number of coastal States
which heretofore had not made specific claims proceeded to do so;
some of the claims being for more than three miles. Greece and
Iran, for example, claimed six miles, Mexico claimed nine miles,
and Guatemala twelve miles. 20 By 1945, twenty-seven of forty-
four reporting States (61 percent) claimed three-mile territorial
seas, fifteen claimed between four and twelve miles, and two-
Guatemala and the Soviet Union 2L--claimed twelve miles.22
The second phase, termed the "new era" in territorial claims,
began in 1945 with the Truman Proclamation stating that the
United States exercised jurisdiction and control over the natural
resources of its contiguous continental shelf.23 Although the state-
ment did not include a specific outer limit to the shelf, an accom-
panying legal memorandum suggested the 100-fathom (600-foot)
isobath as the maximum depth.24 The Proclamation was unilat-
eral; no other country had advanced such a claim. The text also
specified that the supeijacent waters, beyond territorial limits,
would continue to have the status of high seas.25 However, an ac-
companying proclamation stated that within the high seas areas
contiguous to the United States coast the government reserved
the right to establish fishery conservation zones, should these
prove necessary. 26
The Truman Proclamation unleashed a flurry of new maritime
claims. In October 1945, Mexico proclaimed jurisdiction over its
continental shelf and established a fishery conservation zone of
unclear seaward limits.27 The following year both Argentina and
Panama claimed control of the resources of their adjacent shelves
and of the superjacent waters, and in 1947 Chile and Peru de-
20. Boggs, National Claims in Adjacent Seas, 41 GEOG. REV. 185, 192-98 (1951).
21. Most surveys of territorial sea claims credit the Soviet Union with adopt-
ing a twelve-mile breadth in 1927.
22. Johnston & Gold, Extended Jurisdiction: The Impact of UNCLOS III on
Coastal State Practice, in LAW OF THE SEA: STATE PRACTICE IN ZONES OF SPECIAL
JURISDICTION 31 (1982).
23. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945), reprinted in S. ODA, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPmENT. BASIC DOCUMENTS 341 (1972).
24. A. HOLuCK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 49 (1981).
25. Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 23.
26. Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (1945), reprinted in S. ODA, supra
note 23, at 342.
27. Krueger & Nordquist, The Evolution of the 200-Mile Exclusive Economic
Zone: State Practice in the Pacific Basin, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 321, 326 (1979).
clared sovereignty over the resources of their contiguous waters
to 200 miles from shore. 28 In 1952, Peru, Ecuador and Chile joined
in the Santiago Declaration which proclaimed their sovereignty
and jurisdiction out to 200 miles from the coast, while preserving
the right of innocent passage beyond narrow territorial limits.29
In assessing trends in territorial claims since the end of World
War II it is important to note the growth in the number of in-
dependent coastal States. In 1945 there were sixty-five States; by
the end of 1982, the figure had grown to 137.30 Virtually all of the
new countries had been former colonies of the western powers-
Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United States.
As dependencies these countries assumed the conservative terri-
torial breadths of their mother countries; with independence
came the opportunity to expand their offshore claims.
The combination of reactions to the Truman Proclamation and
the growth of new independencies combined to erode considera-
bly the three-mile territorial limit. A survey taken in 1950 re-
vealed that 59 percent of the States reporting specific territorial
breadths claimed three miles. Eight years later, the percentage of
three-mile claims had dropped to thirty-seven, with thirteen coun-
tries claiming twelve miles, and three claiming 200 miles.31
The Law of the Sea Conferences
The gradual seaward expansion of maritime claims was one of
the compelling factors behind the support the United States and
other maritime States gave to the convening of the First United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in the
spring of 1958. At the Conference the topic of territorial sea
breadths was but one of a wide spectrum of subjects negotiated.
Ultimately, four Conventions emerged covering the issues of the
continental shelf; fisheries, the high seas, and the delimitation of
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is mea-
sured.32 But no consensus was reached on a standard breadth of
the territorial sea.33 The "traditionalists" held out for three miles
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, STATUS OF THE WORLD'S
NATIONS 2 (1980).
31. LImirrs IN THE SEAS No. 36, supra note 1.
32. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, TJ.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.LA.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Conven-
tion on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29,
1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.LA.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
33. A. HoLucK, supra note 24, at 152-53.
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while others maintained that States should be free to choose
breadths of up to twelve miles.
The search for consensus on several maritime issues led to the
convening of a Second United Nations Conference in Geneva in
1960 (UNCLOS II). At that meeting a principal topic was again
the choice of a standard breadth of the territorial sea.3 4 By 1960
questions of exclusive fishing rights beyond territorial limits had
become important, and a compromise proposal calling for a six-
mile territorial sea (combined with an exclusive fisheries zone ex-
tending from six to twelve miles offshore) was narrowly de-
feated.3 5 The United States had supported the compromise
proposal, but, with the failure of the Conference to adopt the com-
promise, the United States resumed its support of the three-mile
concept.
In the 1960's and early 1970's the number of coastal States and
territorial claims beyond three miles continued to grow.3 6 By 1972
only twenty-five out of 111 reporting States (22 percent) claimed a
three-mile territorial sea.3 7 Fifteen States claimed between three
and twelve miles, fifty-six claimed twelve miles, and fifteen others
claimed more than twelve miles, of which eight were 200 miles. 38
But the focus of world attention had shifted somewhat from terri-
torial breadths to the projected resources of the deep seabed, and
it was primarily the latter interest which led to the convening in
December 1973 of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 111).39 The negotiations, which lasted
through the spring of 1982, resulted in the adoption of a Conven-
tion text,40 article 3 of which reads "[e]very State has the right to
34. Id. at 140.
35. Smith, Trends in National Maritime Claims, 32 PROF. GEOG. 216, 218 (1980).
36. V. PREscOT, TaE PoiTcAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE OCEANS 68 (1975).
37. Johnston & Gold, supra note 22, at 43.
38. Id.
39. In the late 1960's both the United States and the Soviet Union were in
favor of convening a Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea be-
cause of their concern with the steadily increasing territorial sea claims. Eventu-
ally their efforts were supplemented by the support of a number of developing
countries which had been stimulated by the "common heritage" concept for the
deep seabed minerals.
40. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Convention], which was opened for sign-
ing on December 10, 1982, was the latest of a long series of texts, dating back to the
Informal Single Negotiating Text of May 1975.
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceed-
ing twelve nautical miles ......
Recent Activities
By the end of 1982, twenty-four States out of a total of 125 re-
porting (19 percent) still claimed a three-mile territorial sea (Ap-
pendix, Table 1).41 Six countries had claims between four and
twelve miles, while seventy-seven states (60 percent) asserted
twelve-mile claims.42 Because of the wording of article 3 of the
Convention text, territorial claims of greater than twelve miles
would be in violation of the Convention; nevertheless, twenty-six
countries claimed breadths greater than twelve miles (fourteen of
these to 200 miles). 3 One possible compromise is that worked
out by Argentina, El Salvador and Uruguay which, although re-
taining their 200-mile claims, have enacted legislation permitting
navigation and overflight beyond the twelve-mile limit.44 It
should be noted, in keeping with the Convention text, that several
of the traditional three-mile countries, such as France, Japan and
Canada, have recently extended their territorial breadths to
twelve miles.
Territorial Sea Baselines
An important issue with respect to expanding offshore claims
concerns the baselines from which the breadths of the territorial
sea and other offshore zones are measured. The Convention text
sets out specific criteria to be followed in determining "normal"
baselines which follow the low-water line along the coast, and the
cloging lines for bays and river mouths. But article 6 also pro-
vides for straight baseline systems in localities where the coast-
line is deeply indented or there is a fringe of islands in the
immediate vicinity of the coast. Where straight baselines are
used, the waters between the baselines and the low-water line
have the status of internal waters. Although general guidelines
are provided for the delimitation of straight baselines, a number
of countries appear to have acted in a manner inconsistent with
the text, in that their coastlines do not justify use of the straight
baseline regimes and/or the baselines delimited are more sweep-
ing than is provided for in article 6.45
41. OFFcE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, NATIONAL IARiTIME
CLAIMS (1982) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL MARrmE CLAIMS].
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Lmrrs in THE SEAS No. 36, supra note 1, at 18, 55, 166.
45. Guinea, for example, which has a fairly even coastline, has delimited a sin-
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Other Maritime Jurisdictional Zones
The need of a coastal State to exercise jurisdiction in its off-
shore waters has traditionally been related to its enforcement of
its domestic laws. The seaward extension of national claims was
particularly relevant with regard to smuggling but other activi-
ties, such as violations of prohibition laws, were also important.
To cope with the problems, the concept of the contiguous zone
emerged, and in response to the need article 24 of the 1958 Ge-
neva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
reads: "In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea,
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea .... 46
The article also provides that "[t]he contiguous zone may not ex-
tend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured."47 Twenty-one States
now have extra-territorial contiguous zones. 48 The new Conven-
tion text follows closely article 24 of the 1958 Convention but in-
creases the permissible breadth of the contiguous zone to twenty-
four miles. 49
Much of the concern by coastal States over the breadth of the
territorial sea has involved exclusive fishing rights and in the
years since World War 11 the movement has grown to establish
extra-territorial fishing grounds.50 The 1958 Geneva Conventions
contained no provisions for such action, but even in that year,
twenty-three States claimed fishing jurisdiction beyond the limits
of their territorial seas.5 ' Many of these claims were to twelve
niles or less, though there were six 200-mile claims. By 1973, at
the time of the convening of UNCLOS HI the number of extra-ter-
ritorial fishing claims had risen to thirty-two, of which twelve
gle straight baseline covering most of the coast which measures 120 nautical miles
in length.
46. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958,
art. 24(1) (a), 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1612, TJ.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 220.
47. Id. art. 2.
48. Among these States are Bangladesh, Burma, Egypt, India, Netherlands,
Norway, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Venezuela and the United States.
49. Convention, supra note 40, art. 33, para. 2.
50. A. HoLUcK, supra note 24, at 162.
51. Of these, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama and
Peru had 200-mile fisheries claims.
were to 200 miles. 52
Exclusive Economic Zone
The fishing zone concept is closely related to that of the exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ), a zonal arrangement which grew out
of UNCLOS ]]a.53 Within its EEZ, the coastal State has exclusive
rights to the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil and of
the superjacent waters (that is, fisheries), as well as jurisdiction
with regard to marine scientific research, marine environmental
protection and preservation, and the establishment and use of ar-
tificial islands, installations and structures.54
The EEZ rights include those of an exclusive fishing zone and
of the continental shelf regime, as well as the additional jurisdic-
tions noted above. For coastal States, the EEZ extends to 200
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.55 Rights of navigation by foreign vessels and of
overflight prevail in the EEZ beyond territorial limits. 5 6
The EEZ concept was first presented at UNCLOS III in the
summer of 1974. Since that time, even though the Convention
text has yet to enter into force, fifty-six countries have estab-
lished 200-mile economic zones (Appendix, Table 2).57 Thirty-six
other States have declared 200-mile exclusive fishing zones
(EFZ), preferring to forego, at least for the time being, the addi-
tional rights available to them in the EEZ (Appendix, Table 3).58
The total area closed off by these 200-mile zones is about 28 mil-
lion square nautical miles,5 9 or some 32 percent of the total ocean
space of the world.60
Continental Shelf
A final zone of maritime sovereignty is the continental shelf de-
fined in the Convention text as the seabed and subsoil of the sub-
marine areas that extend beyond a coastal State's territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
52. To this list, supra note 50, were added Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua,
Somalia and Sierra Leone.
53. W. EXTAVOUR, THE ExcLusIvE EcoNoMc ZONE: A STUDY OF THE EVOLU-
TION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 6,
301-02 (1979).
54. Convention, supra note 40, art. 56.
55. Id. art. 57.
56. See id. art. 56.
57. NATIONAL MiAmTmIE CLAIMs, supra note 41, at 1.
58. Id.
59. Measurements are in square nautical miles. One square nautical mile
equals 1.325 square statute miles or 3.430 square kilometers.
60. NATIONAL MKaUnE CLAIMS, supra note 41, at 1.
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outer edge of the continental margin.61 The "legal" definition, as
contained in the text, differs from the physical or "geomorphologi-
cal" definition in four respects. First, the legal definition includes
most of the total continental margin-shelf, slope and rise. Sec-
ond, the legal shelf terminates not at the base of the rise, but at
some point landward of the base, according to a set of alternative
formulae. Third, the legal shelf begins only at the outer limits of
the territorial sea, rather than at the low-water line. Finally, the
legal shelf extends seaward to the outer edge of the continental
margin or "to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where
the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to
that distance." 62 Clearly a deep seabed, such as Peru's 200 miles
off a narrow-shelf coast, does not conform with the physical conti-
nental margin, yet Peru has sovereign rights to this expansive
area's natural resources.
In situations where the physical continental margin extends be-
yond the 200-mile limit, the Convention text provides a set of al-
ternative criteria for determining the geographical limits to the
legal shelf.63 The task of delimiting the outer boundaries of the
legal continental shelf beyond 200 miles will be a difficult and
time-consuming one, which few of the broad-margin coastal
States have yet addressed.64 According to article 82 of the Con-
vention, the coastal State shall make payments or contributions
in kind to the International Seabed Authority once it begins com-
mercial exploitation of the non-living resources of the legal conti-
nental shelf in areas -beyond the 200-mile limit.65 Table 4
61. Convention, supra note 40, art. 76, para. 1.
62. Id. The above provision guarantees the coastal State sovereign rights over
the natural resources of the entire extent of its exclusive economic zone, including
the seabed, the subsoil and the superjacent waters.
63. According to article 76, the outer edge of the continental margin, more
than 200 miles from the territorial sea baselines, may be determined either by a
line connecting fixed points not more than sixty miles from the foot of the conti-
nental slope, or a line connecting fixed points on the continental rise, at each of
which the thickness of the sedimentary rocks is at least one percent of the short-
est distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope. There are geo-
graphic limits even here-350 nautical miles from the baseline, or 100 miles
seaward of the 2,500-meter isobath. Id. paras. 4, 5, 7.
64. Officials of the Government of Canada have reported that the outer limits
of jurisdiction on their continental shelf have been determined, and that an official
map will soon be forthcoming from the Canadian Oil and Gas Lands Administra-
tion in Ottawa.
65. Convention, supra note 40, art. 82, para. 1.
(Appendix) lists the "Broad-Margin" States which have substan-
tial areas of continental margin seaward of the 200-mile limit.66
Archipelagic States
One of the political phenomena which has occurred in the years
since World War 11 has been the achievement of independence by
countries composed solely of island groups. Prior to 1945 there
were only three independent multi-island States-Japan, New
Zealand, and Great Britain. In all three cases their territory con-
sisted of one or more major islands, with a few smaller ones on
the periphery. But since that time about twenty multiple-island
countries have become independent. Following independence,
several governments became concerned over the status of their
inter-island waters. Should each island, islet and rock have a ter-
ritorial sea of its own, or could the island unit be closed off as a
legal archipelago, with the waters inside the closing line having a
special status, akin to internal waters? In 1960, Indonesia carried
out this exercise of closing off its entire archipelago as a separate
unit.67 The action met strong resistance from the maritime States
which feared for the navigational freedoms of their vessels pass-
ing through Indonesian waters.68
Although the archipelago concept won little support at UN-
CLOS I, it did receive recognition at UNCLOS III, and a descrip-
tion of the technique for dealing with "archipelagic States" is
contained in the Convention text.69 Briefly stated, an insular
State, whose geography conforms to specified criteria,70 has the
right to delimit straight baselines joining the outermost points of
the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.7 1 Sea-
ward of these lines it would measure its territorial sea and exclu-
sive fishing or economic zone. Within the lines, the inter-island
66. See infra Appendix, Table 4 (data from the Office of the Geographer, U.S.
Dep't of State).
67. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LIM=TS IN THE SEAS No.
35, at 1 (1971).
68. Syatauw, Revisiting 'The ArchipelagoL--An Old Concept Gains New Re-
spectability, 19 INDIA QUART. 104, 104-19 (1973); see also M. LEnER, MALACCA, SIN-
GAPORE, AND INDONESIA 23-25 (1978).
69. Convention, -upra note 40, art. 47.
70. The two principal criteria are, first, that the ratio of the water enclosed
within the baselines to the area of the enclosed land, including atolls, is between 1
to 1 and 9 to 1; second, that the length of the closing baselines shall not exceed 100
miles, except that 3 percent of the number may be up to a maximum length of 125
miles. Id. paras. 1, 2.
71. See, e.g., P. RODGERS, MIDOCEAN ARCHIPELAGOS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A STUDY IN THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (1981); An-
drew, Archipelagos and the Law of the Sea: Island Straits States or Island-Stud-
ded Space? 2 MAINE PoL'Y 46 (1978); Amerasinghe, The Problem of Archipelagos
and the Law of the Sea, 23 IN'L & COMP. L. Q. 539, 539-575 (1974).
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waters would be "archipelagic," through which ships of all States
enjoy the right of innocent passage.7 2 Further, "archipelagic sea-
lanes" would be designated passing through the archipelago, con-
forming to normal passage lanes used as routes for international
navigation or overflight. Along such sealanes, foreign ships and
aircraft enjoy the right of transit. The net effect of the archipelago
provisions is to further close off considerable areas of former high
seas, particularly in the Pacific. Table 5 (Appendix) presents a
partial list of archipelagic States.7 3 It should be pointed out that
despite the incompleted status of the Convention text, a number
of island countries have already undertaken the delimitation of
their archipelagic baselines. Also, some of the steps taken in
designating legal archipelagos fail to conform to the provisions
outlined in the Convention text.
74
Areas of Special Competence
Closed Areas and Restricted Zones
Over and above the patterns of territorial, contiguous, and ex-
clusive economic or fisheries zones, archipelagos, and continental
shelves, there are forms of "special competence" which further
reduce the areas of free seas available to the use of all countries.
One group of these are the "closed" or "restricted" seas and bays
that generally have the status of internal waters and are closed off
at their entrance by straight baselines. Seaward of these lines the
coastal state measures its territorial sea and other offshore zones.
The most frequently used method for closing off a semi-en-
closed area as internal waters is to claim it as an historic bay. Al-
though the legal bases for such claims are imprecise, a number of
countries have proceeded to designate these areas.75 Notable ex-
amples of historic bays are Canada's claim to Hudson Bay,
China's claim to the Gulf of Pohai, Burma's claim to the Gulf of
Martaban, and Soviet claims to the White Sea, Cheshskaya Gulf,
72. "Archipelagic" waters are virtually the same as territorial Waters.
73. See infra Appendix, Table 5 (data from the Office of the Geographer, U.S.
Dep't of State).
74. As shown by the data in Appendix, Table 5, infra, for example, a number
of countries have claimed an archipelagic regime for island groups over which
they still exercise sovereignty.
75. M. STROHL, THE INIERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS 253-58 (1963).
and Peter the Great Bay (Appendix, Table 6).7 6 Soviet writings
are not clear as to the status of claims to the Gulf of Riga and the
Sea of Azov, to the special nature of the Sea of Okhotsk as an in-
ternal sea, or to the status of the Arctic seas north of Siberia as
"claimed seas."
A number of coastal States have announced the creation of "se-
curity zones" seaward of, and adjacent to, their territorial limits,
in which certain foreign military activities are prohibited. North
Korea, for example, declared in 1977 that it had established a mili-
tary zone extending to fifty nautical miles from its coast.77 Within
this zone (which included the twelve-mile territorial sea), naviga-
tion or overflight by any vessel is prohibited without prior permis-
sion. Such action is in violation of article 58 of the new
Convention text.78 In the same year Vietnam proclaimed a
twenty-four-mile security zone, extending to twelve miles beyond
its territorial sea.79 Again, foreign warships must seek prior per-
mission to enter the security zone. Syria holds that foreign war-
ships need prior permission to come within thirty-five miles of the
Syrian coast.80 And, although such regulations are also not justi-
fied in the Convention text, a number of coastal States have laws
which require prior notification, (and many times, also approval)
before warships can enter their territorial sea.81
The Arctic
A final area of special competence is the Arctic. Canada and
the Soviet Union have adopted the "sector principle," under
which converging meridians, marking the eastern and western ex-
tent of their Arctic coasts, are carried northward to the Pole. All
islands found within these sectors belong to the respective conti-
nental power.82 But there are also indications that the govern-
ments of the two countries believe that the Arctic water areas
within these sectors have a special status. It is argued that be-
cause of the fragile nature of the Arctic environment the coun-
tries must take special precautions against vessel source and
other forms of pollution. In 1970, Canada enacted the Arctic Wa-
ters Pollution Prevention Act, which asserts Canada's jurisdiction
to regulate all shipping in contiguous zones up to one hundred
76. See infra Appendix, Table 6 (data from the Office of the Geographer, U.S.
Dep't of State).
77. L mrs iN ThE SEAS No. 36, supra note 1, at 99.
78. Convention, supra note 40, art. 58.
79. Lnsrs iu THE SEAS No. 36, supra note 1, at 171.
80. Id. at 151.
81. Id.
82. W. BU=rLnn, NORTHEAST ARCTIC PASSAGE 122-23 (1978).
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miles off its Arctic coasts in order to guard against pollution of the
region's marine resources.83 The Act applies to waters north of
600 north latitude, and provides for the establishment of shipping
safety control zones, within which the government may make reg-
ulations relating to navigation.8 4 Statements by Canadian officials
in recent years indicate that Canada considers the waters within
its Arctic archipelago to be "Canadian waters" and rejects claims
that any part of the Northwest Passage through these islands con-
stitutes an "international strait." So far as the Soviets are con-
cerned, the principal direct challenge to the Soviet position
regarding the status of the waters north of Siberia occurred in
1967 when permission was denied for the passage of the United
States Coast Guard icebreakers Edisto and Eastwind through
Vilkitski Strait, connecting the Kara and Laptev seas.8 5 The ice-
breakers turned back rather than attempt passage.
THE IMPACTS OF CURRENT JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS ON OCEAN USE
The new pattern of national claims to offshore control has had,
and will continue to have, considerable impact on various forms
of ocean use. Most of the claims conform in general outline with
the provisions of the Convention text, but there are notable ex-
ceptions, including territorial sea claims in excess of twelve miles,
and regulations involving prior notification and consent for the
passage of warships in the territorial sea. It is unclear how
strongly these non-conforming claims will be pursued. It is also
unclear what the legal status of certain Convention text provi-
sions will be when applied to States which have not signed and/
or are not parties to the Convention once it has entered into force.
General Considerations
The Uneven Allocation of Offshore Areas
Granting each of the coastal States the right to a 200-mile exclu-
sive economic or fisheries zone results in conditions of gross ineq-
uities. Some countries, such as the United States, Indonesia and
New Zealand, have enormous 200-mile zones; the United States,
83. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, in LAW or
THE SEA: THE UNITED NATIONS AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT 204 (L, Alexander ed.
1971).
84. Id.
85. W. BUTLER, supra note 82, at 122.
for example, measures over two million square nautical miles. It
is estimated that the combined 200-mile zones of the ten countries
with the largest zones encompass one-third of the world's eco-
nomic zone area.8 6
On the other hand, there are coastal countries such as Iraq, Jor-
dan, Zaire and Belgium, which have almost no 200-mile zone
whatever. And there are thirty land-locked States with no off-
shore zones at all (Appendix, Table 7).87
Considerations of the possible value of 200-mile zones should
not be based on size alone. What are the potential resources in-
cluded within the zones? Are there important commercial fish
stocks? Are there shelf resources, particularly hydrocarbons?
The latter question involves the issue of whether all or most of
the zones are underlain by a physical continental shelf or margin.
Seven of the ten States having the largest 200-mile zones are also
listed as "Broad-Margin States";8 8 only Japan, Mexico, and Chile
are excluded.
In terms of commercial fish stocks, the living resources of the
ocean tend to be concentrated either in the shallow shelf or bank
areas of the world or, for certain pelagic (free-swimming) species,
where upwellings of currents carry vital plankton to sustain living
aquatic resources. The latter phenomena are found off such west
coast countries as Peru and Namibia.
Within the range of shallow-water fisheries, the most fertile
grounds for commercial fishing are found in the middle latitudes.
Among the nations whose 200-mile zones contain extensive fish-
ig grounds are the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Ca-
nada, Iceland, Norway, and Argentina. On the other hand,
countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and the Caribbean island
States claim that the ecological nature of their offshore waters
has greatly limited commercial fish resources in their 200-mile
zones. There may be more abundant fish resources off other trop-
ical and subtropical countries, but the individual stocks tend to be
small and the species considerably intermixed. Such conditions
greatly complicate the methods of fish processing and of
marketing.
With respect to offshore oil and gas, a similar pattern of ineq-
uity exists. Countries having extensive hydrocarbon resources in
their 200-mile zones include the United States, Canada, Mexico,
86. NATIONAL MARITIME CLAIMs, supra note 41, at 5.
87. Alexander, The Disadvantaged States and the Law of the Sea, 5 MARIN
PoL'Y 196 (1981).
88. See Appendix, Table 4 (data from the Office of the Geographer, U.S. Dep't
of State).
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United Kingdom, Norway, Indonesia, Nigeria, the Persian Gulf
States (particularly Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates),
Brazil, Gabon, Angola, India, Malaysia, China, and New Zealand.
Combining the commercial potentials for both living and non-liv-
ing resources in the 200-mile zones leads to the conclusion that
only a few countries are extremely well off in terms both of the
size of their zones and the marine resource potentials which they
contain.
Maritime Boundary Delimitations
Seaward extension of maritime jurisdictional zones brings in-
creased problems of delimitation of the boundaries between op-
posite and adjacent States. Initially, adjacent countries must
delimit any boundaries separating their internal waters from one
another.
There are no "ground rules" for such a delimitation. If the area
of internal waters is an extensive one, as in the case of the Gulf of
Maracaibo between Venezuela and Colombia, settlement of the
boundary may be a long and difficult process.
Seaward of the baselines for measuring the respective States'
territorial seas, the question arises of the division of territorial
waters of opposite and adjacent States. Article 15 of the Conven-
tion text reads:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other,
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to
the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is
measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is nec-
essary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit
the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance
therewith.
Beyond the territorial sea are the continental shelf and margin.
Prior to World War II, the legal status of a country's adjacent con-
tinental shelf was unclear and no attempts were made to delimit
boundaries between the shelves of one state and another. Pan-
ama in 1921 and Venezuela in 1935 made claims to jurisdiction
over pearl fisheries beyond the limits of their territorial seas,8 9
and in 1941 Venezuela claimed jurisdiction over the resources of
its continental shelf and superjacent waters.9 0 The following year
89. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 27, at 324.
90. Id.
Venezuela and the United Kingdom, on behalf of its territory
Trinidad, agreed to a delimitation of the continental shelf in the
Gulf of Paria, between Trinidad and the South American
mainland.91
In the years since World War II, considerable controversy has
surrounded the process of delimiting continental shelf bounda-
ries. Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf
reads:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or
more States whose coasts are opposite to each other, the boundary of the
continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless an-
other boundary is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the
median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points
on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each
State is measured.92
In several instances since 1958, States have resorted to litigation
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the delimitation
of their shelf boundaries. One dispute was the North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf Cases (1969) between the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and its neighbors Denmark and the Netherlands.93 There,
the ICJ ruled that Germany was not bound by the median-line
provisions of the 1958 Convention, and that the countries should
delimit their common shelf boundaries according to "equitable
principles." Later cases before the Court involved the United
Kingdom and France (1977)94 and Libya and Tunisia (1982).95
To further complicate an already complex situation, there is
now a need to delimit boundaries between opposite or adjacent
EEZs or EFZs. Over the past several decades a number of legal
arguments have developed, particularly through judicial deci-
sions, with respect to continental shelf delimitations. Would such
arguments also apply to economic or exclusive fishing zone delim-
itations? There had been no international judicial decisions relat-
ing to boundaries between fishing zones beyond the territorial
sea, since such zones were not recognized by international law. A
related question is whether a continental shelf boundary would
necessarily be the same as an economic zone boundary.
91. Id.
92. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6(1), 15 U.S.T. 471,
474, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 316.
93. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Republic of Germany v. Den-
mark) (Fed. Republic of Germany v. Neth.), 1969 LC.J. 3.
94. See Brown, The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Cases, 16 SAN Dinao L
REV. 461, 463 n.7 (1979); see also Colson, The United Kingdom-France Continental
Shelf Arbitration, 72 Am. J. INT'L L. 95, 95-112 (1978).
95. Cases Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 LC.J. 18
(Judgment of Feb. 24).
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With respect to both the continental shelf and 200-mile zone
boundaries, the Convention text offers little in the way of guide-
lines. According to article 74:
The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
96
If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of
time, the States concerned are directed to resort to dispute settle-
ment involving binding decisions, as outlined in the Convention
text.97 The dispute may be submitted to the ICJ, the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or an arbitral tribunal
which is mutually acceptable to the parties involved. Identical
provisions are provided in article 83 with respect to the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adja-
cent coasts.
If all opposite and adjacent coastal countries (together with the
dependent territories) declare 200-mile economic or fisheries
zones, and then seek to draw the boundaries between overlapping
areas, a number of new maritime delimitations would come into
existence. Many countries which face one another across dis-
tances of less than 400 miles do not share a common continental
shelf or margin. Puerto Rico and Venezuela, for example, face
one another across 300 miles. of the deep Caribbean basin but
their 200-mile zones overlap. The same situation exists across the
Mediterranean Sea between Spain's Balaeric Islands and Algeria,
or in the South China Sea between the Philippines and China. It
has been estimated that "[tihere may approximately be 331 po-
tential maritime boundaries required by a universal claim to 200-
mile zones." 98 For the United States alone (including its overseas
territories) there would be approximately thirty maritime bound-
aries to be negotiated.99
The first case in which a maritime boundary decision has in-
96. Article 38 of the Convention, supra note 40, lists some considerations the
court should apply in deciding issues in accordance with international law.
Among these are international conventions establishing rules expressly recog-
nized by the contesting States, international custom, and the general principles of
law "recognized by civilized nations."
97. Convention, supra note 40, arts. 186-192 and Annexes V-IX.
98. Smith, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, 71 GEOG. REV. 395,
397 (1981).
99. Id.
volved both the continental shelf and the 200-mile zones between
countries is the United States/Canadian Case on the Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area.OO The case
is being submitted to a five-person Chamber of the International
Court of Justice, and the decision should be a significant one for
the delimitation of future continental shelf/200-mile zone bounda-
ries. Perhaps, in time, some "principles" will evolve from judicial
decisions, state practice, arbitrations, and other means, so that
settlements of at least some of the 331 Potential boundary dis-
putes in the 200-mile zone may be facilitated. But there is little at
the present time to suggest a speed-up in the process.
Living Marine Resources
In assessing the impact of jurisdictional claims on ocean use,
consideration will be given first to the use of marine resources,
and then to non-resource activities such as navigation, military
uses and marine scientific research. The partitioning of the wa-
ters adjacent to the coast has had a profound effect on the har-
vesting of the living resources of the sea. Over 90 percent by
volume of the world's commercial fish catch is estimated to be
taken within the 200-mile belt.o1 The Convention text gives the
coastal State sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring, ex-
ploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of its
economic zone, although it tempers these rights by calling on the
State to adhere to a "full utilization" concept.10 2 "Full utilization"
means that the coastal State shall maintain or restore the har-
vested species at levels "which can produce the maximum sus-
tainable yield as qualified by relevant environmental and
economic factors.' 03 If the State lacks the capacity to harvest the
entire allowable catch, it shall give other States access to the
surplus. 0 4
When considered on the global scale the 200-mile concept
would seem to have both positive and negative aspects with re-
spect to living marine resources. The coastal State may protect
its domestic fishermen from undue competition from foreigners,
carry out necessary conservation measures throughout the zone,
100. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Canada v. United States) (Advisory Opinion, Judgment of Feb. 1,
1982); see, e.g., Rhee, Equitable Solutions to the Maritime Boundary Dispute Be-
tween the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine, 75 AA. J. Ib'N L. 590-628
(1981).
101. Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the
Law of the Sea, 12 SAN Diuo L. REV. 569, 586 (1975).
102. See Convention, supra note 40, art. 62.
103. Id. art. 61, para. 3.
104. Id. art. 62, para. 2.
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and derive revenues from the sale of rights to other countries to
fish in the zone. It can also expel foreign fishing vessels from the
zone if proscribed rules and regulations are not followed.105
On the negative side, a country possessing a small and/or re-
source-poor zone may be denied access to other zones of the area,
except through bilateral agreements or regional plans. States
with large distant-water fleets may also lack access to other coun-
tries' zones-a particularly acute problem for such countries as
the Soviet Union, Japan, West Germany, United Kingdom, United
States, Spain, Poland, Thailand, South Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan.
The Convention text has no provision for handling trans-bound-
ary stocks, and while it does suggest a regional approach to the
management of highly migratory species, including tuna, sword-
fish, dolphin, sauries and marlins, the provisions may prove un-
workable. Likewise, the text's approach to the management of
anadromous stocks (for example, salmon and shad) 106 may not be
a viable arrangement. What is important here is that eighty-nine
countries now claim exclusive fishing limits of up to 200 miles
(with or without attendant economic zone claims) and two
others-Maldives and Tonga--claim rectangular or polygonal
zones surrounding their island areas. Ninety-one zones should
mean ninety-one sets of conservation, management and enforce-
ment regulations, and ninety-one fisheries development pro-
grams. While it is impossible to generalize here on the changes
taking place in the structure of world fisheries as a result of this
enclosure movement, and the success countries have had in cop-
ing with new problems of management, a few points should be
noted.
One point with respect to enclosure involves the activities of in-
ternational fisheries organizations. At least in the short-term,
countries-both developed and developing-having once acquired
new ocean areas of fisheries jurisdiction, are reluctant to share
management responsibilities either with their neighbors or with
international groups. Some of the regional fisheries organizations
composed primarily of developing States have made little pro-
105. The coastal State can also make political use of the right of access by for-
eign vessels to its exclusive fisheries as the United States did, following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, by expelling Soviet fishing vessels from its own 200-mile
zone.
106. Convention, supra note 40, art. 66.
gress since the institution of the 200-mile zones in data acquisi-
tion and analysis and in the formulation of conservation
measures; concurrently, several of the fisheries organizations of
developed countries, particularly in the northwest and northeast
Atlantic, have seen their memberships dwindle and have been
forced to reorganize with their focus on waters beyond the 200-
mile limits.
Another consequence has been an overcapacity of distant-water
fishing fleets. In an effort to locate new sources of supply, vessels
have been exploring and exploiting the Antarctic krill. Here, un-
like the case in many other new fisheries, the interested parties
have succeeded in concluding a Convention on the Conservation
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 0 7 which is designed to
carry out research on the krill and to formulate and adopt conser-
vation measures before large-scale exploitation begins.
But the results of the protective action afforded by the creation
of 200-mile zones may also lead to oversupply of vessels and gear.
For example, in 1976, the year before the American Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act' 08 took effect (in effect banning
foreign fishing from the United States 200-mile zone), the number
of fishing vessels of more than five gross registered tons in New
England amounted to 562, according to the National Marine Fish-
eries Service, and there were 2,499 commercial fishermen.109 The
average yearly catch per vessel in constant dollars was worth
$50,300.110 By 1980, there were 836 registered vessels of over five
gross tons in the New England fishery, the number of commercial
fishermen had increased to 3,698 and the value of the average
yearly catch per vessel had slid to $40,900.111 Without some form
of a limited entry scheme, the assets acquired through the enclo-
sure movement may become dissipated.
Continental Shelf Resources
The continental shelf regime, as outlined in the Convention
text,1 2 would appear to grant the coastal State all the rights it re-
quires in order to explore and exploit the non-living resources of
its adjacent continental shelf. One potential problem is article
121, which holds that "fr]ocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or an economic life of their own shall have no exclusive
107. Done in Washington, D.C., May, 1980 (not yet in force). See Bnuns, LEGAL
MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION OF "PIRATE" WHALING 35 (1982).
108. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976).
109. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1982, at 36, coL 3.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Convention, supra note 40, arts. 76-85.
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economic zone or continental shelf." The British, who control
Rockall Island, an uninhabited rock located 289 miles west of
Scotland on Rockall Bank, maintain that the Rock has an exclu-
sive fisheries zone of its own, as well as its own continental
shelf." 3 There are other uninhabited oceanic islands where the
justification for continental shelf and 200-mile clams may also
arise. Australia's Heard and McDonald Islands in the Southern
Indian Ocean, for example, are uninhabited, as are Johnston and
Midway Islands, United States territories in the Pacific south of
Hawaii. In a situation such as that of France's uninhabited Ker-
guelen Island, also in the southern Indian Ocean, there might be a
question about the status of the fairly extensive continental shelf
which surrounds the island.
Deep Seabed Minerals
Beyond the limits of national jurisdiction on the seabed is the
international area" 4 over which the International Seabed Author-
ity (Authority) "shall take measures necessary to promote the
growth, efficiency, and stability of markets for those commodities
produced from the minerals derived from the Area, at prices
renumerative to producers and fair to consumers."1 15 Without go-
ing into the details of the Authority's operations, one might ques-
tion the limits of the Authority's jurisdiction.
The geographic limits of a coastal State's legal continental shelf
are described in the Convention text" 6 and in time these should
be duly established." 7 The concern noted above about the use of
uninhabited rocks and islands as basepoints for measuring 200-
mile zones is particularly relevant in the east central Pacific close
to the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. In this Zone, stretching from off
the Mexican coast to the vicinity of Hawaii, manganese nodules
high in concentrations of nickel and copper have been found, and
this may prove to be a prime area for early leasing and exploita-
tion of nodules. But within this area are uninhabited islands, par-
113. Brown, Rockall and the Limits of National Jurisdiction of the UK, 2
MARINE PoL'Y 181, 275 (1978).
114. Convention, supra note 40, art. 1.
115. Id. art. 151, para. 1(a).
116. Id. art. 76.
117. Article 76, paragraph 8 provides that the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf "shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters re-
lated to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf." The final
limits of the shelf shall be based on these recommendations.
ticularly the four Islas Revilla Gigedo belonging to Mexico and
France's Clipperton Island, all of which might possess important
nodule resources within their 200-mile radii.
A second problem relates to oceanic ridges which extend for
thousands of miles through the ocean basins. One of these is the
Mid-Atlantic Ridge, stretching from north of Iceland through the
Azores, Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha. The Convention
text is unclear as to the distance along ridges of this sort1 18 to
which islands may claim jurisdiction; in years to come, some con-
troversies may develop concerning the legitimacies of certain ac-
tivities on oceanic ridges.
International Navigation
Issues of navigation by both military and non-military vessels
played a key role in the decisions both by the United States and
the Soviet Union in the late 1960s to press for a third Law of the
Sea Conference. Article 16 of the 1958 Convention on the Territo-
rial Sea and the Contiguous Zone had provided that "[tihere
shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships
through straits which are used for international navigation be-
tween one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas
or the territorial sea of a foreign State." Article 14 defined inno-
cent passage as being "not prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State." The concept of non-suspendable in-
nocent passage does not include non-innocent passage, that is,
passage which (in the interpretation of the coastal State or some
other party) might be considered as detrimental to the coastal
State's "peace, good order, or security."119
In the years since 1958, the United States, the Soviet Union, and
other maritime States have sought a revision of article 16 which
removes the reference to innocent passage. Innocent passage
through straits does not include passage by warplanes over the
strait, nor submerged passage of foreign submarines through the
waterway.120 For these and other reasons, the maritime States
would prefer the concept of unimpeded transit passage through,
and over straits which are used for international navigation.121
Such passage by ships and aircraft, according to article 38 of the
118. See id.
119. Id. art. 19.
120. Pirtle, Transit Rights and U.S. Security Interests in International Straits:
The "Straits Debate'" Revisited, 5 OCEAN D.V. & I'LN. L. 477, 481 (1978).
121. These straits are defined in article 37 of the Convention, supra note 40, as
"used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclu-
sive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone."
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Convention text "shall not be impeded." 22
According to John Norton Moore, who played a major role in
the drafting of the Convention articles on transit passage, the arti-
cles satisfy United States navigational interests, both militarily
and otherwise. 23 But Michael Riesman124 disagrees, arguing that
there is an absence in the text of an express right of submerged
passage within the context of other provisions and that the com-
petence of the coastal State is enhanced by the text to character-
ize any particular straits passage as violating "transit" requisites.
It should be noted that ships travelling the sealanes of the
world pass through the 200-mile zones of many coastal States,
whether or not in transit through one or more of the international
straits. The straits themselves are of three categories, according
to breadth. First, there are about sixty important straits which
would be closed off by the extension of the territorial sea
breadths from three to twelve miles. Second, there are perhaps
twenty frequently-used straits less than six miles in breadth
which would be closed off even by adjacent three-mile territorial
seas. And finally, there are some thirty important straits of
breadths greater than twenty-four miles; through such straits, a
belt of high seas would extend, even if both bordering States
claimed a twelve-mile territorial sea.
With regard to the movement of foreign vessels through a coun-
try's EEZ, the question may arise as to whether the coastal State
can deny or restrict passage on the grounds of the danger of ves-
sel-source pollution. Actually, there are three categories of poten-
tial transiting vessels-warships, other vessels owned or operated
by a State and used on government non-commercial service, and
private vessels, the bulk of which are commercial. Ships of the
first two categories enjoy sovereign immunity from environmental
protection regulations within the EEZ.25
The coastal State has the right, within its EEZ, to adopt non-
discriminatory rules and standards against vessel-source pollu-
tion and.to enforce these when necessary. The rules and stan-
dards shall be established through "the competent international
122. Id. art. 38, para. 1.
123. Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, 74 Am. J. INV, L. 77, 77-121 (1980).
124. See Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal
of International Lawmaking, 74 AB. J. INT'L T. 48, 48-76 (1980).
125. Convention, supra note 40, art. 211, para. 4-5.
organization" (IMO-the Intergovernmental Maritime Organiza-
tion), or through a general diplomatic conference. 26 The rules
and standards to be applied against foreign vessels in the EEZ
shall not be more effective than the international ones, except for
conditions of special circumstance where, in clearly defined areas
of the EEZ, it is necessary, because of oceanographic and ecologi-
cal conditions, to adopt special mandatory measures for the pre-
vention of pollution from ships.127 Yet despite these safeguards, a
number of coastal States have already adopted domestic legisla-
tion with regard to vessel-source pollution which is more severe
than the rules and regulations of the IMO Convention. 28 The
passage of "potential polluters," such as nuclear-powered vessels,
vessels carrying nuclear or other "hazardous" cargoes, and am-
munition ships, through the EEZs of some coastal States may in
time be jeopardized, treaty or no treaty.
Military Uses
The military interest in the process of expanding maritime
claims relates to aspects of the process which might threaten the
ability of naval and air forces to move through and over the
world's oceans to the degree necessary to meet a wide variety of
military and politico-military conditions. The military is particu-
larly concerned with passage through straits, archipelagic sea-
lanes, and other "choke points" and is insistent on the right to
transit such areas on the surface, in the superjacent air space,
and, where depth permits, by submerged submarines. In addi-
tion, the military holds that the right of innocent passage through
territorial waters, as outlined in article 17 of the Convention text,
and the preservation of high seas freedoms in the EEZ, as noted
in article 58, also serve to meet its requirements.129
But there are several potential problems on the horizon. As
noted earlier, there is a tendency on the part of a number of
States to enact domestic legislation requiring that the passage of
warships (and in some cases also, aircraft) through their territo-
rial waters be allowed only after the transiting State has made
prior notification of the passage to the coastal State; in a number
of cases consent must also be obtained.130 At the present time
twenty-three States have such a requirement in their legisla-
126. Id. para. 1.
127. Id.
128. Burke, National Legislation on Ocean Authority Zones and the Contempo-
rary Law of the Sea, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INV'L L. 289, 289-322 (1981).
129. Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea, 58 Fop. ArF. 902, 915
(1980).
130. Id. at 904.
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tion.131 Also, as noted earlier, about eighteen States have extra-
territorial "security zones" in which passage by warships and mil-
itary aircraft requires prior notification and approval.132 Another
troublesome trend is the prohibition by a few coastal States of the
passage of nuclear-powered vessels through their coastal wa-
ters. 3 3 Since some of the newer vessels of the major military
countries are nuclear-powered, this prohibition could give rise to
difficulties.
The military is sensitive to expanding territorial claims. Be-
cause the United States still claims only a three-mile territorial
sea, the government holds that it is not required to recognize ter-
ritorial seas greater than this breadth proclaimed by other coun-
tries. Moreover, the United States has on occasion sought to
challenge what it believed to be exorbitant claims by other coun-
tries to coastal water bodies on the grounds of their being historic
waters. 34 One such challenge in Libya's Gulf of Sidra in August
1981 led to a confrontation between American and Libyan planes
and the loss of two Libyan aircraft.
Marine Scientific Research
Only relatively few nations of the world have the capability of
sustaining major marine scientific efforts in areas well beyond
their own EEZs. Parenthetically, most of the distant-water re-
search carried out by these few nations occurs within 200 miles of
the shorelines of other countries. Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas135 noted the high seas freedoms
which were to prevail throughout the oceans beyond territorial
limits, including freedom of navigation, overflight, fishing, the lay-
ing of submarine cables and pipelines, and other freedoms "Which
are recognized by the general principles of international law." To
the United States and other major maritime powers, these "other
freedoms" included marine scientific research. Consent of the
coastal State would be required only with respect to marine sci-
entific research undertaken within a State's territorial sea or
131. NATIONAL MARITME CLAIMs, supra note 41.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See V. PREscor, supra note 36, at 97; see also supra note 74.
135. Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2314, T.IA.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 82.
"concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there."136
The contest at UNCLOS III for specific recognition of the free-
dom of scientific research within the newly-conceived EEZ was
an uneven one, pitting the United States, Western Europe, and
Soviet bloc countries against scores of other States which felt that
unbridled scientific research by a few developed countries within
the EEZs of other States represented an infringement of their na-
tional rights. Eventually the supporting coalition broke apart, and
article 56 of the Convention text grants the coastal State, in its
EEZ, jurisdiction with regard to marine scientific research. 37 The
consequence of this condition means that ultimately about one-
third of the world's ocean space (and in many respects the most
scientifically interesting portion) will be closed to foreign re-
search vessels except through the acquisition of prior consent.
Although article 246 reads: "Coastal States shall, in normal cir-
cumstances, grant their consent for marine scientific research
projects by other States or competent international organizations
in their exclusive economic zone or on their continental shelf
S. .,"' it seems likely-for political, economic, or other reasons-
that consent for foreign scientific research projects may at times
be withheld or seriously delayed. 3
8
SOME POTENTIAL TRENDS iN THE OCEAN ENCLOSURE MOVEMENT
Listed below are several categories of activities associated with
the ocean enclosure movement which can be expected to occur
within the coming years.
Continued Expansion of Maritime Claims within the Current
Jurisdictional Framework
Some countries, such as Belize, Finland, Italy and Israel, which
have not yet asserted a 200-mile zone, may do so in time. Others
may expand the claimed competencies in their zone, changing
them from exclusive fisheries to exclusive economic zones.
Archipelagic states (for example, the Bahamas, Comoro Islands,
and Vanuatu-formerly New Hebrides) may become closed off by
archipelagic baselines. And although it presently seems unlikely
that a coastal State would extend its exclusive economic or
fisheries zone more than 200 miles offshore, certain countries may
seek forms of functional jurisdiction beyond that limit, as in the
136. Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 5(8), 15 U.S.T. 471, 474,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 316.
137. Convention, supra note 40, art. 56, para. l(b) (ii).
138. See, e.g., Wooster, Research in Troubled Waters: U.S. Research Vessel
Clearance Experience, 1972-1978, 9 OCEAN DEv. & IT'L L. 219, 219-239 (1981).
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case of straddling stocks which move back and forth across the
200-mile limit, or of perceived needs to take extraordinary meas-
ures to protect against vessel-source pollution.
Increased Expressions of Nationalism in Offshore Jurisdictional
Zones
This trend may take various forms, such as the arrest of foreign
fishing vessels, refusal to grant consent for foreign marine scien-
tific research in the EEZ, and greater restrictions against the pas-
sage of military vessels and aircraft in and beyond the territorial
sea. Hopefully, such expressions will be primarily a short-term
phenomenon.
Improved Environmental Protection Measures in the EEZ
Since the right of a coastal State to protect the marine environ-
ment of its EEZ is guaranteed by article 56 of the Convention
text, threats to environmental quality should diminish over time.
Further, there is opportunity to give special consideration to ar-
eas of the EEZ which have unique oceanographic and ecological
conditions (for example, barrier reefs) as well as ice-covered ar-
eas where pollution could cause irreversible disturbances of the
ecological balance.
Uncertainties as to Binding Force of Convention Text Articles
This may work in any of several ways. First, there are jurisdic-
tional assertions which have been and will continue to be made
which are beyond the framework of the Convention text.139 Once
the Convention comes into force, these claims will be subject to
challenge-as indeed they are prior to entry into force.
Second, there are provisions in the text which countries may
fail to live up to. Among these are the regulations for managing
highly migratory species, and for providing special rights and
compensations to land-locked and geographically disadvantaged
States. Finally, as noted earlier, there is the question of the appli-
cability of the Convention text provisions to non-party States.
139. See, e.g., Pharand, Historic Waters in International Law with Special Ref-
erence to the Arctic, 21 U. TORONTO L. J. 1, 1-14 (1971).
Development of a Modus Vivendi Between and Among States
with Adjacent or Opposite EEZs
Despite the increased nationalism noted earlier, coastal States
within a relatively short space of time are realizing the need for
bilateral and subregional forms of cooperation in such matters as
fishing, shipping, pollution control, law enforcement and the de-
velopment of offshore hydrocarbons. This means at least ad hoc
agreements, and the postponement of efforts to settle such seri-
ous problems as maritime boundary delimitation.
Gradual Re-emergence of Marine Regional Arrangements
Moves toward regional arrangements may initially take rela-
tively innocuous forms, such as the basin-wide pollution control
activities of the Regional Seas Programme.140 There may be re-
gional agreements to adopt uniform regulations with respect to
foreign marine scientific research, or the creation of nuclear-free
zones in a common area. In time such arrangements will carry
with them increased costs for the coastal States, along with in-
creased efforts to ban certain activities by non-littoral States.
There are, of course, other categories of activities affected by
the ocean enclosure movement, but the forms they may take ap-
pear unclear at this time. Will the total world fish catch grow or
decline as a result of the apportionment of former high seas fish-
ing grounds? What indirect effects may the creation of the Inter-
national Seabed Authority have on future non-seabed uses? The
past fifteen years have seen cataclysmic changes both in the legal
regime of the oceans and in the political dialogues among ocean-
user States. The next fifteen years will hopefully provide breath-
ing space for adjustment to the new conditions.
140. See Alexander, Regional Arrangements in the Oceans, 71 Am. J. Vrr'L . 84,
104 (1977).
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Four Nautical Miles (2)
Finland
Norway
Six Nautical Miles (4)
Dominican Republic
Greece






































































































Twenty Nautical Miles (1)
Angola
Thirty Nautical Miles (2)
Nigeria
Togo
Thirty-Five Nautical Miles (1)
Syria
Fifty Nautical Miles (4)
Cameroon
Gambia, The
Seventy Nautical Miles (1)
Mauritania
One Hundred Nautical Miles (1)
Senegal















* Overflight and navigation permitted beyond twelve nautical miles.
Table 2






























































































































States with Archipelagic Claims
Philippines
Sao Tome & Principe
Solomon Islands***
Archipelagic Claims to Non-Independent Areas
Danlac Archipelago (Ethiopia)
Galapagos Archipelago (Ecuador)
* no closing lines yet determined
** interim delimitation arrangement








Important Historic Bays and Other Closed Water Bodies
Gulf of Matias
Gulf of San Jorge
St. Vincent Gulf
Shark Bay
Spencer Gulf
Gulf of Martaban
Hudson Bay
China
Italy
Libya
Panama
Soviet Union
Afghanistan
Andorra
Austria
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Burundi
Central African Republic
Chad
Czechoslovakia
Table 7
Land-Locked States
Hungary
Laos
Lesotho
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Malawi
Mali
Mongolia
Nepal
Niger
Gulf of Pohai
Gulf of Taranto
Gulf of Sidra
Gulf of Panama
Cheshskaya Gulf
Sea of Okhotsk
Paraguay
Rwanda
San Marino
Swaziland
Switzerland
Uganda
Upper Volta
Vatican City
Zambia
Zimbabwe
